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Abstract—As one of the promising information-centric net-
working (ICN) architectures, named data networking (NDN)
has attracted tremendous research attentions and efforts in
the past decade. In particular, security and privacy remain
as one of the significant concerns and challenges, due to the
fact that most of the traditional cryptographic primitives are
no longer suitable for NDN architecture. For example, the
traditional cryptographic primitives aim to secure point-to-point
communications, always requiring explicit descriptions of where
or whom the data packets are intended to, while network
addressing or locating in NDN becomes implicit. To deal with
such issues, the recently developed cryptographic primitives such
as attribute-based encryption (ABE) have been applied to NDN.
Also, to efficiently solve the trust-roots problem and seamlessly
deploy cryptographic infrastructures, the concept of Software-
Defined Networking (SDN) has been introduced to NDN as well.
This tutorial is devoted to exploring the interesting integration
between NDN, ABE and SDN.
I. INTRODUCTION
While the Internet has become an indispensable part of
our daily life, its access modes and functionalities experience
dramatic change due to the rapid development of Internet
applications and services. The legacy TCP/IP architecture has
been increasingly recognized to suffer from some fundamental
flaws in routing expandability, mobility, as well as security and
privacy protection. Therefore, the future Internet architectures
(FIA) [1] has been proposed and gained widespread recogni-
tion in the past decade, among which two representative new
networking paradigms are information-centric networking (IC-
N) [2] and software-defined networking (SDN) [3]. Specifical-
ly, instead of using traditional network addressing techniques
(e.g., IP address, NAT, DNS), ICN is focused on content-
based routing by implementing the transformation from the
idea of “WHERE to find the required contents” to the idea of
“WHAT kind of contents to be found”. Among the various ICN
techniques, content-centric networking (CCN) [4] and named
data networking (NDN) [5] have gained wider popularity,
and CCN/NDN testbeds have already covered more than 30
cities across America and Asia. SDN, as another paradigm
of FIA, provides not only conveniences for developing new
network applications, but also unified and rapid deployment
of various newly developed FIAs, thanks to the separation
of control plane and data plane. At present, OpenFlow based
SDN technique has won support from both academia and
industry, and the related international standards and world-
wide testbeds are gradually setup [6].
Despite their advantages, all kinds of ICN architectures
face new challenges in security/privacy aspects [7], [8]. In
particular, both NDN and SDN community pay far less atten-
tion to the security and privacy issues than they deserve. For
example, although the name-based routing technique in NDN
naturally provides a robust way to mitigate DDoS like attacks
targeting IP networks, novel attacks that particularly exploit
the features of NDN have been identified, e.g., interesting
flooding attack (IFA). The same story occurs in SDN, in which
an SDN controller compromised by malicious network app
may lead to the failure of the whole network, while the SDN
switches can be also poisoned to launch DDoS attacks to
the controller. It is worth noting, however, the straightforward
application of traditional security mechanisms to those novel
networking paradigms are not effective, primarily because that
the new networking architectures do not explicitly specify
how to deploy security or privacy mechanisms. For instance,
it remains unclear how to design effective cryptographic
protocols in NDN architecture, considering the fact that most
of those protocols heavily dependent on the network addresses
or locations, which are not available in NDN.
This tutorial is intended to propose a framework which
bridges NDN architecture with the newly developed crypto-
graphic primitives such as attribute-based encryption (ABE),
and specifically discusses the feasibility of coupling NDN and
SDN together in solving the trust-roots problem by seamlessly
deploying cryptographic infrastructures.
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Fig. 1. TCP/IP Architecture vs. NDN Architecture [5]
II. SECURITY IN NDN
The original concept of ICN was proposed in 1999 [2],
which was defined as a new networking paradigm that users
are concerned with the contents or data instead of their
locations or network addresses. Among various innovative
practices of ICN, the alliance of CCN and NDN manifests
a promising prospect, and the two terms are sometimes inter-
changeable.
Technically speaking, NDN is a clean-slate design that
does not rely on TCP/IP architecture. As shown in Fig.1,
the performance bottleneck (i.e. the so-called “this-waist”
part) in NDN is due to NDN chunks instead of IP packets.
That means, instead of treating host-based addresses as the
first-class network objects, NDN regards data as the first-
class network objects that are associated with globally unique
names, finally leading to a name-based routing mechanism.
Thus, the notion of “host” is no longer explicitly specified
in NDN, while interest and data are the only two types of
packets in NDN. To implement name-based routing algorithm,
each NDN router maintains three major data structures: (1)
Pending Interest Table (PIT), which contains currently un-
satisfied interests and corresponding incoming interfaces; (2)
Forwarding Interest Base (FIB), which contains name prefixes
and corresponding outgoing interfaces; (3) Content Storage
(CS) for data caching and retrieval. Then the communications
in NDN use the pull model: a consumer requests content of
interest by sending an interest packet; If an entity (a router
or a host) can find a matched content object (i.e., named
data packet) in its CS, the corresponding data packet will
be returned to the requester by simply following the reverse
path of the interest request. Naturally, such receiver-driven
and data-centric communication protocol are immune from
DDoS attacks targeting at traditional TCP/IP architecture. In
particular, IP spoofing becomes impossible. Also, in NDN, it’s
usually the closest cache nodes which respond the requests. As
a result, DDoS attacker can not simply overwhelm a victim
node by repeatedly sending the interest requests. Moreover,
NDN provides certain built-in security mechanisms for data
protection. For example, all the data traveling in the network
are digitally signed by the data producers, ensuring data
authenticity and integrity.
Despite the aforementioned built-in mechanisms, a set of
security challenges still remains in NDN, some of which are
highlighted in the following.
• First, in TCP/IP networks, the deployment of traditional
cryptography primitives rely on the trust roots, e.g., cer-
tificate authority (CA), public-key infrastructures (PKI),
which are however hard to be deployed due to the lack
of explicit network addressing in NDN.
• Second, due to the name-based routing mechanism and
lack of explicit network address in NDN, content protec-
tion and access control become extremely challenging.
In particular, as the data producers do not know the
potential requesters, they cannot encrypt the data in
advance without the knowledge of the receiver. In fact,
the data producers are even not involved in the routing,
and the data has already been cached in some NDN nodes
that are close to the interest requesting nodes.
• Last but not least, NDN suffers from interest flooding
attacks (IFA) and content poisonous attacks (CPA) [9].
Specifically, IFA aims to exhaust PIT resources of the
related routing NDN nodes by exploiting the feature
of name-based routing. IFA becomes even worse when
malicious data published with an eye-catching or fancy
name along with an invalid verification key. This will
attract requests of potential consumers, which however
lead to numerous repeated requests, since the return
packet fails to pass the signature verification. Also, as the
signature verification in NDN routing nodes is optional,
the hijacked cache node might inject malicious data in
the middle routing nodes, eventually the poisoned data
will be cached in all the nodes along the request-response
routing path.
III. SECURITY IN SDN
In 2008, with a primary objective to simplifying the switch
design of Ethane, OpenFlow protocol was proposed and quick-
ly gained popularity in both industry and academy. Then the
following years have witnessed the rapid development of SDN.
In 2014, the open-source SDN operation system ONOS and
the open NFV platform program OPNFV were announced
respectively. Generally, SDN architecture consists of three
planes [6]: application plane, which runs different network
applications; control plane, which manages network intelli-
gence and decision making from data plane, which contains
the physical forwarding devices. The communications between
the three planes are enabled by northbound APIs (app-control
plane) and southbound protocols (control-data plane), e.g.,
OpenFlow. In addition, the configuration and communication
compatibility and interoperability between different data and
control plane devices can be enabled by open and standard
west-east interfaces and protocols.
To date, non-trivial research efforts have been paid to
identify security threats in SDN. As shown in Fig.2, seven
critical threat vectors have been identified [6]. For example, the
first threat vector refers to the DDoS attacks potentially caused
by forged traffic flows. An attacker can exploit particular
vulnerabilities of the forwarding devices (attack vector 2), as
well as the logically centralized controllers (vector 4). The
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Fig. 2. SDN Architecture and Attack Vectors [6]
communications between data plane and control plane via
OpenFlow can be also potentially compromised (vector 3).
Vector 5 refers to the fact that the controller can be com-
promised by the malicious network apps. The administrative
station hosting the controller is vulnerable to attacker as well
(vector 6), and vector 7 represents the lack of trust resources
for fast fault diagnosis and secure recovery. While vectors
1,2,6 and 7 are commonly seen in traditional networks, vectors
3, 4 and 5 are essentially resulted from the separation between
control and data planes, as well as the SDN controller.
In [10], Grusho et al. pointed out that SDN security could
be enhanced by at least two ways: One is to securely cou-
pling SDN with other new FIAs for gaining complementary
advantages, and the other is to, via cryptographic means,
prevent malicious entities from accessing critical information.
However, to the best of our knowledge, few specific solutions
has been seen. We are therefore motivated to propose our
solutions to put these two suggestions together in the next
section.
IV. LEVERAGING ABE AND SDN TO SECURE NDN
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an interesting exten-
sion of identity-based encryption (IBE). Different from those
certificates of users in traditional PKI which are produced
and maintained via Certificate Authority (CA), certificates
in IBE are implicitly bounded with the relationship between
the users’ identities and their associated secrets, which are
produced by a trust third party named Private Key Gener-
ator (PKG). Compared with CA, PKG has a much smaller
workload in the sense that PKG need not to maintain users’
certificates after sending the corresponding secret keys to
users via secure channels. From 1984 to 2001 when Boneh
and Franklin proposed the first practical IBE scheme, peo-
ple took a 17 years long journey in probing this problem.
After then, IBE manifests a quick development. To support
using IBE in a hierarchical organization (say an international
company), IBE was extended to hierarchical identity-based
encryption (HIBE). To support living things features (such
as iris) being used as users identities, fuzzy-identity based
encryption (FIBE) was proposed in 2005, and this concept
was quickly extended to attribute-based encryption (ABE) in
2006 to support more flexible and fine-grained access control.
With ABE, the potential user who has the right to access some
confidential contents are no longer a single user, instead of a
set of users that are determined by an access structure, which
is usually defined as a logical composition of users attributes
such as name, gender, age, living features, and even social
attributes such as affiliations, titles, etc. [11].
The basic diagram of ABE can be illustrated in Fig.3. After
the PKG publishes the system parameters, a data producer (say
a document creator John or Tim) can encrypt the document
with an access structure (say the logic tree marked with
grey background), any NDN user (say Alice) with attributes
that satisfy the access structure can decrypt the document by
using the corresponding secret key SKatt. That is, the data
producer does not need to know who will read the document
in advance. Instead, he/she only needs to encrypt data based
on the knowledge about what kind of user groups can access to
the data. This feature makes ABE particularly useful in NDN,
where a data producer/sender does not need to know who
are the potential data consumer/receivers. More specifically,
we illustrate four desirable properties of ABE that can be
leveraged in NDN,
• Identities. In NDN, each data has a unique name, which
can be naturally used as the identity of the data.
• Hierarchical identity. In NDN, prefix-based naming
method caters to the framework of HIBE, which provides
tailor made supporting on hierarchical routing.
• Fuzzy-identity. By nature, FIBE can support wildcard
characters in name-based routing.
• Attributes. ABE enables the NDN data producers, via
logical composition of attributes, to determine a fine-
grained specification on what kind of users can learn
the encrypted data during the process of encrypting,
without worrying about the real identities of the potential
receivers.
We therefore conclude that the cryptographic primitives
IBE, HIBE, FIBE and ABE have significant potential to
achieve data encryption in NDN. More specifically, the de-
ployment of these cryptographic primitives in NDN are given
in the following.
• First, we need to address the problem of transferring
access rights. No matter IBE, HIBE, FIBE or ABE
primitives are used, the potential decrypting groups are
specified via certain logical composition of their at-
tributes, and this kind of specification becomes fixed
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once it is embedded in the corresponding ciphertexts.
However, the traditional access control in general is a
dynamic and time-variant system, say some users have
promoted their accessibility levels, or the confidentiality
policies towards some encrypted data have changed due
to some unexpected events such as large scope leak-
ages of information of user decryption keys. Thus, we
indeed need a mechanism to, without decrypting-then-
encryting process, transform an encrypted data for an old
access structure/group to an encrypted data for a new
access structure/group. To solve this problem, ABE has
to combine another cryptographic primitive — proxy re-
encryption (PRE), leading to the so-called attribute-based
proxy re-encryption (AB-PRE). Again, let us take Fig.3 as
an example, where AB-PRE enables a semi-trust proxy,
without seeing the plaintexts, transforms the encrypted
data for Alice to another encrypted data for Bob. After
then, Bob can see the corresponding plaintexts by using
his own decryption key [11]. Here, Alice and Bob could
be representatives of identities, attributes, or even access
structures.
• Second, privacy-preserving routing and interests-data
matching are even more complex than encrypting and
decrypting in NDN. Say, in NDN, we might want to look
up some sensitive contents but we do not like to expose
our interests to NDN caching nodes. This is a paradox
since NDN caching nodes need the capability to perform
matching between the requested interests and cached data.
Fortunately, ABE has already coupled successfully with
recently developed cryptographic primitives such as key-
word searchable encryption (KSE) and equality testable
encryption (ETE) [12]. KSE enables us to match encrypt-
ed keywords without decrypting, while ETE enables us
to test whether two random ciphertexts contain the same
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Fig. 4. Attribute Routing System in NDN. (Here, ABAC tree means
attribute-based access control tree, data-names are the global unique names for
identifying the data, data-attributes include all attributes used for defining the
ABAC logic towards the data, while requester-attributes include all attributes
possessed by the interest requester.)
plaintext without decrypting. It is clear that KSE and ETE
are very useful in name-based routing and attribute-based
routing in NDN (See Fig.4), where an interest-packet
consists of two parts: encrypted interests, and encrypted
requester-attributes. The first part will be confidentially
matched with encrypted data-names, while the second
part will be confidentially matched with encrypted data-
attributes.
• Third, deploying trust-roots (say PKG) and security poli-
cies in NDN faces new challenges. In NDN architec-
ture, security layer and strategy layer are separated by
the “thin-waist” layer (See Fig.1). This kind decoupling
mechanism is reasonable since in strategy layer, security
policies are specified by the composition of security
primitives (such as encryption, signature, authentication,
etc.) and aim mainly at what we should do, without much
concern on how to do, while in security layer, concrete
security components (say cryptographic algorithms), are
adopted according to security levels required by upper
layer applications and aim at solving the problem of
how to do. To tackle the challenges due to the lack of
explicit identifies with respect to “host” and “network
address” as mentioned above, SDN is introduced to NDN
for achieving rapid and consistent deployment. More
specifically, we follow the framework of [13], but with the
following improvements, to bridge NDN with OpenFlow
in deploying trust-roots for supporting ABE and other
aforementioned cryptographic primitives (Fig.5):
– At first, name-based routing system (NRS) is ex-
tended to attribute-routing system (ARS) (See Fig.4).
This extension is naturally enlightened by the idea of
attribute-based cryptography that is one of the most
flexible and expressive access control technologies
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Fig. 5. Integration between NDN, ABE and SDN
available today. The feasibility of this extension lies
in that Ion et al. [14] had already implemented ARS
by using CCNx. However, our extension introduces
the following remarkable improvements in the sense
that the Broker in Ion et al.’s framework is removed,
while an “AND/OR”-switchable logic node at top
of the attribute-based access control (ABAC) tree
is newly introduced. More specifically, the interest
forwarding routing and the interest-data matching
process are still inherited from the idea of NRS, but
the backward data packet routing process is changed
in a fully compatible manner: For the intermediate
NDN routing interfaces, the “OR” logic is used,
while for the last hop interfaces (i.e., reaching the
target users), the last data forwarding condition is
automatically switched to “AND” logic. The intuition
behind this modification is: For the target users, only
if his/her attributes satisfy the access policy embed-
ded in the encrypted data, he/she has the ability to
read the data; while for intermediate NDN routing
interfaces, it is reasonable to relax the “AND” logic
to the “OR” logic for keeping a trace of requested
data for potential subsequent similar – either similar
in names or similar in attributes – requests.
– After then, OpenFlow is extended by adding cryp-
tographic primitives and new control plane is built
thereon. The extended OpenFlow controller can be
viewed as nodes of ARS, and the new control plane
consists of ARS and security infrastructures such
as CA, PKG, etc. As for data plane, Salsano’s
architecture can be followed. That is, the data plane
consists of a series of CCN/NDN nodes and clients.
The extended OpenFlow acts as the communica-
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tion interface between control plane and data plane.
For strategy layer, the extended OpenFlow supports
primitive calling specified by security policies, while
for upper security layer, the extended OpenFlow
provide mapping between the primitives and the
concrete security techniques such as running-time
library of cryptographic algorithms.
– Finally, the trust-roots and the authentication chains
are established based on certificate objects. Bian
et al. [15] proposed a deploying hierarchy for key
management in UCLA NDN testbed, where the key-
certificated pair of the testbed own is taken as the
trust-root, while key-certificate pairs of other sites,
users, devices are authenticated transitively via the
chains of key-certificate pairs contained in NDN data
packets. Moreover, with introducing the IBE/ABE
into NDN, the certificate objects can be even simpli-
fied, say let the names or attributes alone acting as
the public-keys. By doing so, most communication
cost on certificates transportation is saved, since
explicit certificates are no longer needed. In practice,
key evolution strategy should be also taken into
consideration in case of someone’s secret key might
be lost or stolen.
It is worth noting that employing ABE to NDN cannot
solve all the security and privacy issues in NDN. To make
our proposed framework useful, one of the assumptions is
to securely implement and efficiently deploy ABE and the
related cryptographic components. Otherwise, the new attacks
or scalability issues can be potentially introduced. Today, most
of implementations of ABE are based on pairing technique.
During the past decade, we have witnessed the rapid progress
of fast and lightweight computations on pairings, and the core
algorithms of ABE can be implemented in milliseconds. The
practices reported in [13], [14] also indicate the feasibility on
combining NDN with ABE and SDN.
Beyond securing NDN with ABE, we proceed to address the
IFA attacks mentioned in Section II. On the one hand, proper
use of cryptography can mitigate the scope and effectiveness
of IFA attacks. For instance, the cryptographic primitive of
attribute-based signature (ABS) can be used to enforce the
6users in sending interest requests, and we can deliberately
choose those ABS schemes in NDN security policy such
that the workload of verification process is much lighter
than the workload of signing process. To further block IFA
attacks, the signatures in interest requests are even enforced
to involve some freshness, say containing timestamps, fresh
random salts, or solving online puzzles. On the other hand,
we have envisioned a lightweight payment prototype for
mitigating IFA attacks in NDN by charging virtual money
for interest querying. In our study, three pricing functions
— linear, asymptotical and exponential — were simulated1
and we found that the simpler the better: Linear pricing
strategy is good enough for ensuring a high ratio of the
number of satisfied interests to the total number of interst
requests (See Fig.6). In brief, the whole NDN network in this
prototype is viewed as an analogy of economic society: each
user can request and obtain interested data via paying some
virtual money, and the charge automatically contains the cost
for content producing, searching/matching, forwarding, and
warehousing. As a result, an IFA attacker will be blocked when
its virtual money is used out. Meanwhile, each NDN router
can earn virtual money carried in the original interest request
packet in providing services of interest/contents delivering
and caching. In a very abstract perspective, we think the
only difference between this analogical NDN society and the
real economic society lies in that a digit product in NDN
society can be copied almost infinite times with little copying
cost, while in real economic society, making two copies of
the same kind of products at least means double of the
material cost. Therefore, an NDN router, by caching popular
contents and providing them to a huge number of down-stream
requests, might quickly become a virtual nabobism, even richer
than the content producers. This mechanism has the potential
to incentive reasonable NDN nodes to request and deliver
contents honestly and collaboratively, resulting in a healthy
networking “ecological” environment.
V. CONCLUSION
Although in the named data networking (NDN) architecture,
data communications are assumed to be encrypted, the lack of
explicit identities with respect to “host” and “network address”
make it extremely hard, if not impossible, to apply traditional
PKI-based cryptographic primitives in NDN. Thus, this tutorial
was intended to propose a framework of using the newly
developed identity/attribute-based encryption (IBE/ABE) in
NDN, by associating identities and attributes with the proper
ingredients of NDN. To further enhance the privacy-preserving
capability of NDN, the mechanism of attribute-based routing
(ARS) was proposed. Finally, SDN architecture is coupled
with NDN for deploying trust-roots (such as PKG). Beyond
securing NDN with ABE, a lightweight prototype of virtual
1Our simulations were carried out by running ndnSIM (http://ndnsim.net/2.
3/index.html) at a Windows 7 desktop with 2.93GHz CPU and 2GB memory.
The simulations were set as follows: (1) The prepayment of an interest request:
100, the maximum number of PIT items: 1000; (2) A random generated
topology consisting of 167 nodes, among which 15% were randomly set as
malicious.
payment mechanism was also suggested to mitigate interest
flooding attacks (IFA).
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